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Abstract
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e.
controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive
case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state variable, and have opposite
interests. These notes constitute a short mathematical introduction to the theory of such
games. Section 1 presents the basic model with finitely many states and actions. We give
proofs of the standard results concerning : the existence and formulas for the values of the
n-stage games, of the λ-discounted games, the convergence of these values when λ goes
to 0 (algebraic approach) and when n goes to +∞, an important example called“The Big
Match” and the existence of the uniform value. Section 2 presents a short and subjective
selection of related and more recent results : 1-player games (MDP) and the compact non
expansive case, a simple compact continuous stochastic game with no asymptotic value,
and the general equivalence between the uniform convergence of (vn)n and (vλ)λ.
More references on the topic can be found for instance in the books by Mertens-Sorin-
Zamir (1994, reedited in 2015), Sorin (2002), Neyman-Sorin (2003) or the chapters by
Vieille (2002) and Laraki-Sorin (2014).
1 The basic model
1.1 Description
Zero-sum games are 2-player games where the sum of the payoffs of the players is 0, they are
games of pure competition between the players. Zero-sum stochastic games are dynamic zero-
sum games played in discrete time. The basic model is due to Shapley (1953), and is given by
∗Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France. This tutorial has been
originally prepared for the program “Stochastic Methods in Game Theory” which took place from November 16
to December 25, 2015, at the National University of Singapore. The lectures were completed while the author
was visiting the Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore in 2015. Repeated Games
with incomplete information and a few open problems have also been presented during the tutorial, but do not
appear in the present version of this document.
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a set of states K with an initial state k1, a set of actions I for player 1, a set of actions J for
player 2, a payoff function g : K × I × J −→ IR, and a transition mapping q from K × I × J
to the simplex ∆(K) of probability distributions over K. In the basic model, K, I and J are
assumed to be non empty finite sets.
The progress of the game is the following:
- The initial state is k1, known to the players. At stage 1, player 1 and player 2 simultane-
ously choose i1 ∈ I and j1 ∈ J . Then P1’s payoff is g(k1, i1, j1) and P2 ’s payoff is −g(k1, i1, j1),
the actions i1 et j1 are publicly announced, and the play proceeds to stage 2.
- A stage t ≥ 2, the state kt is selected according to the distribution q(kt−1, it−1, jt−1), and is
announced to both players. Player 1 and player 2 then simultaneously choose it ∈ I et jt ∈ J .
P1’s payoff is g(kt, it, jt) and P2’s payoff is −g(kt, it, jt), the actions it et jt are announced, and
the play proceeds to stage t+ 1.
Notations and vocabulary. We denote by q(k′|k, i, j) the probability that the state of stage
t+1 is k′ if the state of stage t is k and i and j are played at that stage. A state k is absorbing
if q(k|k, i, j) = 1 for all (i, j) in I × J (when k is reached, the play stays there forever). A
stochastic game is absorbing if it has a unique non absorbing state.
A play is a sequence (k1, i1, j1, k2, i2, j2, ...., kt, it, jt, ...) taking values in K × I × J .
A history of the game is a finite sequence (k1, i1, j1, ...., kt−1, it−t, jt−1, kt) in (K× I×J)t−1×K
for some positive integer t, representing the information available to the players before they
play at stage t.
A behavior strategy, or simply a strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2), associates to every
history a mixed action in ∆(I) (resp. ∆(J)) to be played in case this history occurs. A strategy
of a player is said to be pure if it associates to each history a Dirac measure, that is an element
of I for player 1 and an element of J for player 2.
A strategy is said to be Markov if for any stage t, the mixed action prescribed at stage t only
depends on the current state kt (and not on past states or past actions). A stationary strategy
is a Markov strategy such that the mixed action prescribed after any history only depends on
the current state (and not on the stage number).
As usual, in all the examples player 1 chooses the row, player 2 the column and we indicate
the payoff of player 1 (which is minus the payoff of player 2). An absorbing state will be de-
noted with a *. For instance, 3* represents an absorbing state where the payoff to player 1 is
3, whatever the actions played.
Example 1:
L R
2
T
B
(
0 1∗
1∗ 0∗
)
There is a unique non absorbing state which is the initial state. Actions are T and B for
player 1, L and R for player 2. If at the first stage the action profile played is (T, L) then the
stage payoff is 0 and the play goes to the next stage without changing state. If at the first
stage the action profile played is (T,R) or (B,L), the play reaches an absorbing state where at
each subsequent stage, whatever the actions played the payoff of player 1 will be 1. If at the
first stage the action profile played is (B,R), the play reaches an absorbing state where at each
subsequent stage, whatever the actions played the payoff of player 1 will be 0.
Example 2: A one-player game (J is a singleton), with determinisitic transitions and actions
Black and Blue for Player 1. The payoffs are either 1 or 0 in each case.
✒✑✓✏
✒✑✓✏ ✒✑✓✏ ✒✑✓✏ ✫✪
✬✩
k5
k1 k2 k3 k4 = 0
∗
❄0
✻
1
✲1 ✲1
✲
1
✲1
✲
1
✯1
Example 3: The “Big Match” (
1∗ 0∗
0 1
)
We denote by Σ and T the sets of strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. A couple of
strategies in Σ × T naturally1 induces a probability distribution Pk1,σ,τ over the set of plays
Ω = (K × I × J)∞, endowed with the product σ-algebra. We will denote the expectation with
respect to Pk1,σ,τ by IEk1,σ,τ .
Remark: A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution over his set of pure strate-
gies (endowed with the product σ-algebra). By Kuhn’s theorem (Aumann, 1964), one can show
that mixed strategies and behavior strategies are equivalent, in the following strong sense : for
any behavior strategy σ of player 1 there exists a mixed strategy σ′ of this player such that,
for any pure (or mixed, or behavior) strategy of player 2, (σ, τ) and (σ′, τ) induce the same
probabilities over plays. And vice-versa by exchanging the words “mixed” and “behavior” in
the last sentence. Idem by exchanging the roles of player 1 and player 2 above.
1just as tossing a coin at every stage induces a probability distribution over sequences of Heads and Tails.
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1.2 The n-stage game and the λ-discounted game
Definition 1.1. Given a positive integer n, the n-stage game with initial state k1 is the zero-
sum game Γn(k1) with strategy spaces Σ and T payoff function:
∀(σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T , γk1n (σ, τ) = IEk1,σ,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(kt, it, jt)
)
.
Because only finitely many stages matter here, Γn(k1) can be equivalently seen as a fi-
nite zero-sum game played with mixed strategies. Hence it has a value denoted by vn(k1) =
maxσ∈Σminτ∈T γk1n (σ, τ) = minτ∈T maxσ∈Σ γ
k1
n (σ, τ). For convenience we write v0(k) = 0 for
each k.
Definition 1.2. Given a discount factor λ in (0, 1], the λ-discounted game with initial state k1
is the zero-sum game Γλ(k1) with strategy spaces Σ and T payoff function:
∀(σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T , γk1λ (σ, τ) = IEk1,σ,τ
(
λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1g(kt, it, jt)
)
.
By a variant of Sion theorem, it has a value denoted by vλ(k1). In the economic literature
δ = 1− λ = 1
1+r
is called the discount rate, r being called the interest rate.
Proposition 1.3. vn and vλ are characterized by the following Shapley equations.
1) For n ≥ 0 and k dans K:
(n+ 1) vn+1(k) = Val∆(I)×∆(J)
(
g(k, i, j) +
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j) n vn(k′)
)
.
And in any n-stage game, players have Markov optimal strategies.
2) For λ in (0, 1] and k in K:
vλ(k) = Val∆(I)×∆(J)
(
λ g(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j) vλ(k′)
)
.
And in any λ-discounted game, players have stationary optimal strategies.
Proof: The proof is standard. For 1), fix n and k and denote by v the value of the matrix
game
(
g(k, i, j) +
∑
k′∈K q(k
′|k, i, j) n vn(k′)
)
i,j
. In the game with n+1 stages and initial state
k, player 1 can play at stage 1 an optimal strategy in this matrix game, then from stage 2 on
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an optimal strategy in the remaining n-stage stochastic game. By doing so, player 1 guarantees
v in Γn+1(k), so vn+1(k) ≥ v. Proceeding similarly with player 2 gives vn+1(k) = v.
The proof of 2) is similar. Notice that by the contracting fixed point theorem, for fixed λ
the vector (vλ(k))k∈K is uniquely characterized by the Shapley equations.
It is easy to compute vn and vλ in the previous examples (in absorbing games, we simply
write vn and vλ for the values of the stochastic game where the initial state is the non absorbing
state)
Example 1: v1 =
1
2
, vn+1 =
1
2− n
n+1
vn
for n ≥ 1, and vλ = 11+√λ for each λ.
Example 2: For λ small enough, vλ(k1) =
1
2−λ and it is optimal in the λ-discounted game
to alternate between states k1 and k5. For n ≥ 0, (2n+ 3)v2n+3 = (2n+ 4)v2n+4 = n+ 3 (first
alternate between k1 and k5, then go to k2 3 or 4 stages before the end).
Example 3 (The Big Match): vn = vλ = 1/2 for all n and λ.
The Shapley operator is defined as the mapping which associates to each v in IRK the vector
Ψ(v) in IRK such that for each k,
Ψ(v)k = Val∆(I)×∆(J)
(
g(k, i, j) +
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j) vk′
)
.
Ψ is non expansive for the sup-norm ‖v‖ = supk∈K |vk| on IRK , and the Shapley equations can
be rephrased as:
∀n ≥ 1, nvn = Ψ((n− 1)vn−1) = Ψn(0),
∀λ ∈ (0, 1], vλ = λΨ
(
1− λ
λ
vλ
)
.
1.3 Limit values - The algebraic approach
We are interested here in the limit values when the players become more and more patient, i.e.
in the existence of the limits of vn, when n goes to infinity, and of vλ, when λ goes to 0.
It is always interesting to study first the 1-player case.
1.3.1 1-player case: Markov Decision Process
We assume here that player 2 does not exist, that is J is a singleton. For any λ > 0, player
1 has an optimal stationary strategy in the λ-discounted game. Moreover since the matrix
games appearing in 2) of the Shapley equations only have one column, this stationary optimal
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strategy can be taken to be pure. So we just have to consider strategies given by a mapping
f : K −→ I, with the interpretation that player 1 plays f(k) whenever the current state is k.
The λ-discounted payoff when f is played and the initial state is k satisfies:
γkλ(f) = λg(k, f(k)) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, f(k))γk′λ (f).
Consider the vector v = (γkλ(f))k. The above equations can be written in matrix form: (I −
(1 − λ)A)v = λα, where I is the identity matrix, A = (q(k′|k, f(k))k,k′ is a stochastic matrix
independent of λ, and α = (g(k, f(k)))k is a fixed vector. (I−(1−λ)A) being invertible, we know
that its inverse has coefficients which are rational fractions of its coefficients. Consequently, we
obtain that:
For a given pure stationary strategy f , the payoff γkλ(f) is a rational fraction of λ.
Now we have finitely many such strategies to consider, and a given f is optimal in the
λ-discounted game with initial state k if and only if: γkλ(f) ≥ γkλ(f ′) for all f ′. Because a
non-zero polynomial only has finitely many roots, we obtain that for λ small enough, the same
pure optimal strategy f has to be optimal in any discounted game. And clearly f can be taken
to be optimal whatever the initial state is.
Theorem 1.4. (Blackwell, 1962) In the 1-player case, there exists λ0 > 0 and a pure stationary
optimal strategy f which is optimal in any λ-discounted game with λ ≤ λ0. For λ ≤ λ0 and k
in K, the value vλ(k) is a bounded rational fraction of λ, hence converges when λ goes to 0.
In example 2, f is the strategy which alternates forever between k1 and k5. There exists no
strategy which is optimal in all n-stage games with n sufficiently large.
1.3.2 Stochastic games: The algebraic approach
Back to the 2-player case, we know that in each discounted game the players have stationary
optimal strategies. The following approach2 is due to Bewley and Kohlberg (1976). Consider
the following set:
A = {(λ, xλ, yλ, wλ) ∈ (0, 1]× (IRI)K × (IRJ)K × IRK , ∀k ∈ K,
xλ(k), yλ(k) stationary optimal in Γλ(k), wλ(k) = vλ(k)}.
A can be written with finitely many polynomial inequalities:
∀i, j, k,
∑
i
xiλ(k) = 1, x
i
λ(k) ≥ 0,
∑
j
yjλ(k) = 1, y
j
λ(k) ≥ 0,
2M. Oliu-Barton (2014) provided a proof of the convergence of vλ using elementary tools.
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∀j, k,
∑
i∈I
xiλ(k)(λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′
q(k′|k, i, j)wλ(k′)) ≥ wλ(k),
∀i, k,
∑
j∈J
yjλ(k)(λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′
q(k′|k, i, j)wλ(k′)) ≤ wλ(k).
In particular, the set A is semi-algebraic3. One can show that the projection of a semi-
algebraic set (keeping a smaller number of coordinates) is still semi-algebraic (Tarski-Seidenberg
elimination theroem, see for instance Benedetti and Risler), so A∗ = {(λ, vλ), λ ∈ (0, 1]} is also
a semi-algebraic subset of IR × IRK . This implies the existence of a bounded Puiseux series
development of vλ in a neighborhood of λ = 0.
Theorem 1.5. (Bewley Kohlberg) There exists λ0 > 0, a positive integer M , coefficients rm ∈
IRK for each m ≥ 0 such that for all λ ∈ (0, λ0], and all k in K:
vλ(k) =
∞∑
m=0
rm(k) λ
m/M .
So when λ is close to 0, for each k vλ(k) is a power series of λ
1/M .
Example 1 : vλ =
1−
√
λ
1−λ = (1−
√
λ)(1 + λ+ ...+ λn + ....)
Corollary 1.6.
1) vλ converges when λ goes to 0.
2) vλ has bounded variation at 0, i.e. for any sequence (λi)i≥1 of discount factors decreasing
to 0, we have
∑
i≥1 ‖vλi+1 − vλi‖ <∞.
3) vn also converges, and limn→∞vn = limλ→0vλ.
Proof: 1) is clear by the Puiseux series development.
2) also comes from this development. Fix k in K. When λ is small enough, vλ(k) = fk(λ
1/M)
where fk is a power series with positive radius of convergence, hence
∂vλ(k)
∂λ
(λ) =
1
M
f ′k(λ
1/M)λ1/M−1.
so that there exists a bound C such that for λ small enough, |∂vλ(k)
∂λ
(λ)| ≤ Cλ1/M−1. Now, if
0 < λ2 < λ1, |vλ1(k)− vλ2(k)| ≤
∫ λ1
λ2
Cλ1/M−1dλ = CM(λ1/M1 − λ1/M2 ), and the result follows.
3) The idea4 is to compare vn with the value wn := v1/n of the
1
n
discounted game. Using
the Shapley operator, we have for all n:
vn+1 =
1
n+ 1
Ψ(nvn), and wn+1 =
1
n + 1
Ψ(nwn+1).
3A subset of an Euclidean space is semi-algebraic if it can be written a finite union of sets, each of these sets
being defined as the conjunction of finitely many weak or strict polynomial inequalities.
4The following proof is, I believe, due to A. Neyman.
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Since Ψ is non expansive, ‖wn+1 − vn+1‖ ≤ nn+1‖wn+1 − vn‖ ≤ nn+1(‖wn+1 − wn‖+ ‖wn − vn‖).
We obtain:
(n+ 1)‖wn+1 − vn+1‖ − n‖wn − vn‖ ≤ n‖wn+1 − wn‖.
And summing these inequalities from n = 1 to m gives:
‖wm+1 − vm+1‖ ≤ 1
m+ 1
m∑
n=1
n‖wn+1 − wn‖.
It is a simple exercise to show that if (an)n is a sequence of non negative real numbers satisfying∑∞
n=1 an <∞, the sequence (nan)n Cesaro-converges to 0. By the bounded variation property,
we have
∑∞
n=1 ‖wn+1 − wn‖ <∞. We conclude that ‖wm+1 − vm+1‖ −−−→m→∞ 0.
Bewley and Kohlberg also provided an example where vn is equivalent to
lnn
n
when n goes
to infinity, so (vn) may not have a Puiseux series development in n.
1.4 Uniform value
We fix here the initial state k1, and omit the dependance on the initial state for a while. We
know that limnvn = limλvλ exists, so we approximately know the value of the stochastic game
when n is large and known to the players (and when λ is small and known to the players). But
this does not tell us if the players can play approximately well when they don’t know themselves
exactly how large is n or how small is λ. Do the players have nearly optimal strategies that are
robust with respect to the time horizon or the discount factor ? This property is captured by
the notion of uniform value, which may be considered as the nectar of stochastic games.
Definition 1.7. Let v be a real.
Player 1 can uniformly guarantee v in the stochastic game if: ∀ε > 0, ∃σ ∈ Σ, ∃n0, ∀n ≥ n0,
∀τ ∈ T , γn(σ, τ) ≥ v − ε.
Player 2 can uniformly guarantee v in the stochastic game if: ∀ε > 0, ∃τ ∈ T , ∃n0, ∀n ≥ n0,
∀σ ∈ Σ, γn(σ, τ) ≤ v + ε.
If v can be uniformly guaranteed by both players, then v is called the uniform value of the
stochastic game.
It is easily shown that the uniform value, whenever it exists, is unique. The largest quantity
uniformly guaranteed by Player 1, resp. smallest quantity uniformly guaranteed by Player 2,
can be denoted by:
v = sup
σ
lim inf
n
(
inf
τ
γn(σ, τ)
)
, v = inf
τ
lim sup
n
(
sup
σ
γn(σ, τ)
)
.
Plainly, v ≤ limnvn ≤ v. The uniform value exists if and only if v = v. Whenever it exists it
is equal to limnvn = limλvλ, and for each ε > 0 there exists λ0 > 0, σ and τ such that for all
λ ≤ λ0, σ′ and τ ′ we have: γλ(σ, τ ′) ≥ v − ε and γλ(σ′, τ) ≤ v + ε.
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1.4.1 The Big Match
The Big Match is the absorbing stochastic game described by:
L R
T
B
(
1∗ 0∗
0 1
)
It was introduced by Gillette in 1957. We have seen that limvn = limvλ = 1/2 here. It is easy
to see that player 2 can uniformly guarantee 1/2 by playing at each stage the mixed action 1/2
L +1/2 R independently of everything. It is less easy to see what can be uniformly guaranteed
by player 1, and one can show that no stationary or Markov strategy of Player 1 can uniformly
guarantee a positive number here. However, Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) proved that the
uniform value of the Big Match exists.
Proposition 1.8. The Big Match has a uniform value
Proof: All we have to do is prove that Player 1 can uniformly guarantee 1/2−ε for each ε > 0.
First define the following random variables, for all positive integer t: gt is the payoff of player
1 at stage t, it ∈ {T,B} is the action played by player 1 at stage t, jt ∈ {L,R} is the action
played by player 2 at stage t, Lt =
∑t−1
s=1 1js=L is the number of stages in 1,...,t−1 where player
2 has played L, Rt =
∑t−1
s=1 1js=R = t− 1−Lt is the number of stages in 1,...,t− 1 where player
2 has played R, and mt = Rt − Lt ∈ {−(t− 1), ..., 0, ..., t− 1}. R1 = L1 = m1 = 0.
Given a fixed parameter M (a positive integer) let us define the following strategy σM of
player 1: at any stage t, σM plays T with probability
1
(mt+M+1)2
, and B with the remaining
probability.
Some intuition for σM can be given. Assume we are still in the non absorbing state at stage
t. If player 2 has played R often at past stages, player 1 is doing well and has received good
payoffs, mt is large and σM plays the risky action T with small probability. On the other hand
if Player 2 is playing L often, player 1 has received low payoffs but Player 2 is taking high risks;
mt is small and σM plays the risky action T with high probability.
Notice that σM is well defined. If mt = −M then σM plays T with probability 1 at stage t
and then the game is over. So the event mt ≤ −M−1 has probability 0 as long as the play is in
the non absorbing state. At any stage t in the non absorbing state, we have −M ≤ mt ≤ t− 1,
and σM plays T with a probabilty in the interval [
1
(M+t)2
, 1].
We will show that σM uniformly guarantees
M
2(M+1)
, which is close to 1/2 forM large. More
precisely we will prove that:
∀T ≥ 1, ∀M ≥ 0, ∀τ ∈ T , IEσM ,τ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
)
≥ M
2(M + 1)
− M
2T
. (1)
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To conclude the proof of proposition 1.8, we now prove (1). Notice that we can restrict
attention to strategies of player 2 which are pure, and (because there is a unique relevant
history of moves of player 1) independent of the history. That is, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
player 2 plays a fixed deterministic sequence y = (j1, ...jt, ...) ∈ {L,R}∞.
T being fixed until the end of the proof, we define the random variable t∗ as the time of
absorption:
t∗ = inf{s ∈ {1, ..., T}, is = T}, with the convention t∗ = T + 1 if ∀s ∈ {1, ..., T}, is = B
Recall that Rt = mt + Lt = t − 1 − Lt, so that Rt = 12(mt + t − 1). For t ≤ t∗, we have
mt ≥ −M , so:
Rt∗ ≥ 1
2
(t∗ −M − 1)
Define also Xt as the following fictitious payoff of player 1: Xt = 1/2 if t ≤ t∗ − 1, Xt = 1
if t ≥ t∗ and jt∗ = L, and Xt = 0 if t ≥ t∗ and jt∗ = R. Xt is the random variable of the limit
value of the current state.
A simple computation shows:
IEσM ,y
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
)
= IEσM ,y
1
T
(Rt∗ + (T − t∗ + 1)1jt∗=L)
≥ IEσM ,y
1
T
(
1
2
(t∗ −M − 1) + (T − t∗ + 1)1jt∗=L)
≥ −M
2T
+ IEσM ,y
1
T
(
1
2
(t∗ − 1) + (T − t∗ + 1)1jt∗=L)
≥ −M
2T
+ IEσM ,y
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt
)
To prove (1), it is thus enough to show the following lemma.
Lemma 1.9. For all t in {1, ..., T}, y in {L,R}∞ and M in IN , IEσM ,y (Xt) ≥ M2(M+1) .
Proof of the lemma. The proof is by induction on t. For t = 1, IEσM ,y (X1) =
1
2
(1− 1
(M+1)2
) +
1
(M+1)2
1j1=L ≥ 12(1− 1(M+1)2 ) ≥ M2(M+1) .
Assume the lemma is true for t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}. Consider y = (j1, ...) in {L,R}∞, and
write y = (j1, y+) with y+ = (j2, j3, ...) ∈ {L,R}∞. If j1 = L, IEσM ,y (Xt+1) = 1(M+1)21 + (1 −
1
(M+1)2
)IEσM−1,y+(Xt). By the induction hypothesis, IEσM−1,y+(Xt) ≥ M−12M , so IEσM ,y (Xt+1) ≥
M
2(M+1)
. Otherwise j1 = R, and IEσM ,y (Xt+1) = (1− 1(M+1)2 )IEσM+1,y+(Xt) ≥ (1− 1(M+1)2 ) M+12(M+2)
= M
2(M+1)
. The lemma is proved, concluding the proof of proposition 1.8.
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1.4.2 The existence result
The following theorem is due to J-F. Mertens and A. Neyman (1982).
Theorem 1.10. (Mertens Neyman)
Every zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform value.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of theorem 1.10. Without loss of generality
we assume that all payoffs are in [0, 1], and fix ε ∈ (0, 1) in the sequel.
We know by the algebraic approach that there exists C > 0, M ≥ 1, λ0 > 0 such that for
all 0 < λ1 < λ2 ≤ λ0:
‖vλ1 − vλ2‖ ≤
∫ λ2
λ1
ψ(s)ds with ψ(s) =
C
s1−1/M
.
All is needed about ψ is that it is non negative and integrable:
∫ 1
0
ψ(s)ds <∞.
Definition 1.11. Define the mapping D from (0, λ0] to IR by:
D(y) =
12
ε
∫ λ0
y
ψ(s)
s
ds+
1√
y
.
The proof of the next lemma is left to the reader.
Lemma 1.12.
a) D is positive, decreasing, D(y) −−→
y→0
+∞ and ∫ λ0
0
D(y)dy <∞.
b) D(y(1− ε/6))−D(y) −−→
y→0
+∞ and D(y)−D(y(1 + ε/6)) −−→
y→0
+∞.
c) yD(y) −−→
y→0
0.
Definition 1.13. Define the mapping ϕ from [0, λ0] to IR by:
ϕ(λ) =
∫ λ
0
D(y)dy − λD(λ).
Note that ϕ is increasing and ϕ(0) = limλ→0ϕ(λ) = 0.
We fix the initial state k1 and denote the limit value limλvλ(k1) by v(k1). We now define a
nice strategy σ for player 1 in the stochastic game with initial state k1. While playing at some
stage t + 1, player 1 knows the current state kt+1 and the previous payoff gt, he will update
a fictitious discount factor λt+1 and play at stage t + 1 a stationary optimal strategy in the
stochastic game with discount factor λt+1 and initial state kt+1. The definition of the sequence
of random discount factors (λt)t below, joint with the introduction of an auxiliary sequence
(dt)t, will end the definition of σ.
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One first chooses λ1 > 0 such that: (i) vλ1(k1) ≥ v(k1) − ε, (ii) ϕ(λ1) < ε, and (iii)
∀y ∈ (0, λ1], D(y(1− ε/6))−D(y) > 6 and D(y)−D(y(1 + ε/6)) > 6. Put d1 = D(λ1), and
by induction define for each t ≥ 1:
dt+1 = max{d1, dt + gt − vλt(kt+1) + 4ε}, and λt+1 = D−1(dt+1).
We have λt+1 ≤ λ1 for each t. Notice that if the current payoff gt is high, then λt+1 will
have a tendency to be small : player 1 plays in a patient way. On the contrary if gt is small
then λt+1 will have a tendency to be large : player 1 plays for the short-run payoffs. σ be-
ing defined, we now fix a strategy τ of player 2. We simply write P for Pk1,σ,τ and IE for IEk1,σ,τ .
By construction, the following properties hold on every play. The proofs of a), b) and d)
are left to the reader.
Lemma 1.14. For all t ≥ 1,
a) |dt+1 − dt| ≤ 6,
b) |λt+1 − λt| ≤ ελt6 ,
c) |vλt(kt+1)− vλt+1(kt+1)| ≤ ελt.
d) dt+1 − dt ≤ gt − vλt(kt+1) + 4ε+ 1λt+1=λ1.
Proof of c):
|vλt(kt+1)− vλt+1(kt+1)| ≤ ‖vλt − vλt+1‖
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ λt+1
λt
ψ(s)ds
∣∣∣∣
≤ max{λt, λt+1}
∣∣∣∣
∫ λt+1
λt
ψ(s)
s
ds
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2λt
∣∣∣∣
∫ λt+1
λt
ψ(s)
s
ds
∣∣∣∣ .
Now,∫ λt+1
λt
ψ(s)
s
ds =
ε
12
(
D(λt)− 1√
λt
)
− ε
12
(
D(λt+1)− 1√
λt+1
)
=
ε
12
(
(dt − dt+1) + ( 1√
λt+1
− 1√
λt
)
)
.
If λt ≤ λt+1, 0 ≤
∫ λt+1
λt
ψ(s)
s
ds ≤ ε
2
by point a) of lemma 1.14. So
∣∣∣∫ λt+1λt ψ(s)s ds
∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 , and this
also holds if λt ≥ λt+1. We obtain |vλt(kt+1)− vλt+1(kt+1)| ≤ ελt.
Definition 1.15. Define the random variable
Zt = vλt(kt)− ϕ(λt).
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When λt is close to 0, Zt is close to v(kt).
Proposition 1.16. (Zt)t is a sub-martingale, and for all t ≥ 1:
IE(Zt) ≥ 2εIE(
t−1∑
s=1
λs) + Z1.
Proposition 1.16 is the key to Mertens and Neyman’s proof. Assume for the moment the
proposition and let us see how the proof of the theorem follows.
We have for each t ≥ 1, IE(Zt) ≥ Z1, so IE(vλt(kt)) ≥ vλ1(k1) − ϕ(λ1) + IE(ϕ(λt)) ≥
vλ1(k1)− ϕ(λ1), so
IE(vλt(kt)) ≥ vλ1(k1)− ε. (2)
Since Zt+1 ≤ 1, we have by proposition 1.16 that 2εIE(
∑t
s=1 λs) ≤ 1 − Z1 ≤ 1 + ε, so
IE(
∑t
s=1 λs) ≤ 1ε . We obtain IE(
∑t
s=1 λ11λ1=λs) ≤ 1ε , and
IE(
t∑
s=1
1λ1=λs) ≤
1
λ1ε
. (3)
Using d) and c) of lemma 1.14, we have:
gt ≥ vλt+1(kt+1)− ελt + (dt+1 − dt)− 4ε− 1λt+1=λ1 .
so for each T ,
IE
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
)
≥ IE
(
1
T
vλt+1(kt+1)
)
−εIE
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
λt
)
+IE
(
1
T
(dT+1 − d1)
)
−4ε− 1
T
IE
(
T∑
t=1
1λt+1=λ1
)
Unsing the inequalities (2) and (3), we obtain
IE
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
)
≥ vλ1(k1)− ε− ε−
d1
T
− 4ε− 1
ελ1T
.
And for T large enough, we have:
IE
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
)
≥ v(k1)− 8ε,
independently of the strategy τ of player 2. This shows that player 1 uniformly guarantees
v(k1) in the stochastic game with initial state k1. By symmetry, player 2 can do as well and
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theorem 1.10 is proved.
We finally come back to the proof of the key proposition.
Proof of proposition 1.16: Fix t ≥ 1, and define C1 = ϕ(λt) − ϕ(λt+1), C2 = vλt+1(kt+1) −
vλt(kt+1) and C3 = λt(gt − vλt(kt+1)). A simple computation shows that:
Zt+1 − Zt − (C1 + C2 − C3) = λtgt + (1− λt)vλt(kt+1)− vλt(kt).
Denote by Ht the σ-algebra generated by histories in (K × I × J)t−1 ×K (before players play
at stage t), by definition of σ one has:
IE(λtgt + (1− λt)vλt(kt+1)|Ht) ≥ vλt(kt).
Consequently, we obtain:
IE(Zt+1 − Zt|Ht) ≥ IE(C1 + C2 − C3|Ht). (4)
We have |C2| ≤ ελt by point c) of lemma 1.14. By definition of dt+1, we have dt+1 − dt ≥
gt − vλt(kt+1) + 4ε, hence C3 ≤ λt(dt+1 − dt)− 4ελt. We now prove
C1 ≥ λt(dt+1 − dt)− ελt (5)
If λt+1 < λt, then dt+1 > dt and C1 = ϕ(λt)− ϕ(λt+1) ≥ λt(dt+1 − dt)− (λt − λt+1)(dt+1 − dt)
≥ λt(dt+1 − dt) − ελt by a) and b) of lemma 1.14. If λt+1 > λt, then dt+1 < dt and
ϕ(λt+1)−ϕ(λt) ≤ λt+1(dt− dt+1) = λt(dt− dt+1) + (λt+1− λt)(dt− dt+1) ≤ λt(dt− dt+1) + ελt.
And (5) is proved.
Back to inequality (4), we obtain:
IE(Zt+1 − Zt|Ht) ≥ IE (λt(dt+1 − dt)− ελt − ελt − λt(dt+1 − dt) + 4ελt|Ht) = 2εIE (λt|Ht)
which proves that (Zt)t is a sub-martingale and for all t ≥ 0, IE(Zt+1) ≥ 2εIE(
∑t
s=1 λs) + Z1.
This ends the proof of proposition 1.16.
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2 A few extensions and recent results
We want to go beyond the “simple” case of finitely many states and actions. It is interesting
to start with the one-player case, which is fairly understood.
2.1 1-Player games
2.1.1 General results: the long-term value
We consider a general dynamic programming problem with bounded payoffs: Γ(z0) = (Z, F, r, z0)
given by a non empty set of states Z, an initial state z0, a transition correspondence F from
Z to Z with non empty values, and a reward mapping r from Z to [0, 1]. Here Z can be any
set, and for each state z in Z, F (z) is a non empty subset of Z. (An equivalent MDP variant
of the model exists with an explicit set of actions A, and transitions given by a function from
Z ×A to Z.)
A player chooses z1 in F (z0), has a payoff of r(z1), then he chooses z2 in F (z1), etc...
The set of admissible plays at z0 is defined as: S(z0) = {s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ Z∞, ∀t ≥ 1, zt ∈
F (zt−1)}.
For n ≥ 1, the value of the n-stage problem with initial state z is defined as:
vn(z) = sup
s∈S(z)
γn(s), where γn(s) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(zt).
For λ ∈ (0, 1], the value of the λ-discounted problem with initial state z is defined as:
vλ(z) = sup
s∈S(z)
γλ(s), where γλ(s) = λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1r(zt).
More generally, define an evaluation θ = (θt)t≥1 as a probability on positive integers. The
θ-payoff of a play s = (zt)t≥1 is γθ(s) =
∑∞
t=1 θtr(zt), and the θ-value of Γ(z) is
vθ(z) = sup
s∈S(z)
γθ(s).
The set of all evaluations is denoted by Θ. The total variation of an evaluation θ is defined
as: TV (θ) =
∑∞
t=1 |θt+1 − θt|. Given an evaluation θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt (here δt is the Dirac measure
on stage t) and some m ≥ 0, we write vm,θ for the value function associated to the shifted
evaluation θ ⊕m =∑∞t=1 θtδm+t.
What can be said in general about the convergence of (vn)n, when n → ∞, of (vλ)λ,
when λ → 0, or more generally of (vθk)k, when (θk)k is a sequence of evaluations such that
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TV (θk)→k→∞ 0? Many things, if we focus on uniform convergence.
We now only consider uniform convergence of the value functions. Denote by V the set of
functions from Z to [0, 1], endowed with the supremum metric d∞(v, v′) = supz∈Z |v(z)−v(z′)|.
Saying that a sequence (vk)k≥1 of functions from Z to [0, 1] uniformly converges is trivially
equivalent to saying that the sequence (vk) converges in the metric space V. Notice that in a
metric space, convergence of a sequence (vk) happens if and only if:
1) the sequence (vk)k has at most one limit
5, and
2) the set {vk, k ≥ 1} is totally bounded6.
The above equivalence holds for any sequence in a metric space. But here we consider the
special case of value functions of a dynamic programming problem, with long term limits. It
will turn out that 1) is automatically satisfied.
Definition 2.1. Define for all z in Z,
v∗(z) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
m≥0
vm,θ(z).
The following results apply in particular to the sequences (vn)n and (vλ)λ (see Renault,
2011).
Theorem 2.2. (Renault, 2014)
Consider a sequence of evaluations (θk)k such that TV (θ
k)→k→∞ 0.
Any limit point of (vθk)k is v
∗.
The proof is omitted.
Corollary 2.3. Consider a sequence of evaluations (θk)k such that TV (θ
k)→k→∞ 0.
1) If (vθk)k converges, the limit is v
∗.
2)
(vθk)k converges ⇐⇒ the set {vθk , k ≥ 1} is totally bounded,
⇐⇒ the set {vθk , k ≥ 1} ∪ {v∗} is compact.
3) Assume that Z is endowed with a distance d such that: a) (Z, d) is a totally bounded
metric space, and b) the family (vθ)θ∈Θ is uniformly equicontinuous. Then there is general
uniform convergence of the value functions to v∗, i.e.
∀ε > 0, ∃α > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ s.t. TV (θ) ≤ α, ‖vθ − v∗‖ ≤ ε.
5A limit point of (vk)k being defined as a limit of a converging subsequence of (v
k)k.
6For each ε > 0, the set can be covered by finitely many balls of radius ε. Equivalently, the completion of
the set is compact. Equivalently, from any sequence in the set one can extract a Cauchy subsequence.
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4) Assume that Z is endowed with a distance d such that: a) (Z, d) is a precompact metric
space, b) r is uniformly continuous, and c) F is non expansive, i.e. ∀z ∈ Z, ∀z′ ∈ Z, ∀z1 ∈
F (z), ∃z′1 ∈ F (z′) s.t. d(z1, z′1) ≤ d(z, z′). Same conclusions as corollary 3.
The above results can be extended to the case of stochastic dynamic programming, (i.e.
when F (z) is a set of probability distributions on Z for each z). In this case it is often
convenient to define the value functions vn, vλ, vθ directly by their Bellman equations.
Notice that life is much simpler in the particular case where the problem is leavable, i.e.
when z ∈ F (z) for each z. Then without any assumption, (vn) and (vλ) pointwise converge to
v∗, where: v∗ = inf{v : Z → [0, 1], excessive7, v ≥ r}.
2.1.2 The uniform convergence of (vn)n and (vλ)λ are equivalent.
The results of the previous subsection show in particular that if (vn) and (vλ) uniformly con-
verge, they have the same limit. For these two particular sequences of evaluations, we have a
stronger result.
Theorem 2.4. (Lehrer-Sorin 1992) In a 1-player game, (vn) converges uniformly if and only
if (vλ) converges uniformly. In case of convergence, the limit is the same.
2.1.3 The compact non expansive case and the uniform value
We have stronger results if the state space is assumed to be compact, payoffs are continuous
and transitions are non expansive. We consider here a stochastic dynamic programing problem
(also called Gambling House) Γ = (X,F, r, x0) given by:
• a non empty set of states X , an initial state x0,
• a transition multifunction F from X to Z := ∆f(X) with non empty values,
• and a reward mapping r from X to [0, 1].
Here ∆f (X) is the set of probabilities with finite support over X . We assume that transitions
have finite support for simplicity, however many results concerning the limit value and is char-
acterization can go through without this assumption. When we will study the uniform value,
this assumption will be useful to define strategies avoiding measurability issues.
Here a player chooses u1 in F (x0), then x1 is selected according to u1 and yields the payoff
r(x1), then the player chooses u2 in F (x1), etc... We define as usual the n- stage value
function: vn(x0) = supσ∈S(x0) IEσ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 r(xt)
)
, where S(x0) = {σ = (u1, ..., ut, ...) ∈ Z∞, u1 ∈
F (x0), ∀t ≥ 1, ut+1 ∈ F (ut)}. We define similarly the λ-discounted value vλ(z0), and more
generally for any evaluation θ we have the θ-value vθ(z0).
We assume here that X is a compact metric space with metric denoted by d. The set ∆(X)
of Borel probability measures over X is also a compact metric space (for the weak-* topology),
7v excessive means that v(z) ≥ v(z′) if z′ ∈ F (z), i.e. that v is non increasing on any trajectory.
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and we will use the Kantorovich-Rubinstein metric8: for z and z′ in ∆(X),
dKR(u, u
′) = sup
f :X→IR,1−Lip
∣∣∣∣
∫
x∈X
f(x)du(x)−
∫
x∈X
f(x)du′(x)
∣∣∣∣
= min
pi∈Π(u,u′)
∫
(x,x′)∈X×X
d(x, x′)dpi(x, x′).
X is now viewed as a subset of ∆(X), and we assimilate an element x in X with the
corresponding Dirac measure in ∆(X). The Graph of Γ can be viewed as a subset of ∆(X)×
∆(X), and we denote by convGraph(Γ) its closed convex hull in ∆(X)×∆(X). We define the
set of invariant measures as:
R = {u ∈ ∆(X), (u, u) ∈ convGraph(Γ)}
We will assume that r is continuous, and extend r to a continuous affine function defined
on ∆(X): for u in ∆(X), r(u) is the expectation of r with respect to u. We will also assume
non expansive transitions.
∀x ∈ X, ∀x′ ∈ X, ∀u ∈ Γ(x), ∃u′ ∈ Γ(x′), s.t. dKR(u, u′) ≤ d(x, x′).
This assumption is always satisfied when X is finite9, or when X is a simplex and Γ(x) is the
set of splittings at x, i.e. the set of Borel probabilities on X with mean x.
One can apply here a variant of property 4) of corollary 2.3 to prove uniform convergence
of (vn) and (vλ), but we can obtain a stronger result with a better characterization of the limit
value and the existence of the uniform value.
Theorem 2.5. (Renault-Venel 2017) Assume the state space is compact, payoffs are continuous
and transitions are non expansive. Then (vn) and (vλ) uniformly converge to v
∗, where for each
initial state x,
v∗(x) = inf{w(x), w : ∆(X)→ [0, 1] affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀x′ ∈ X,w(x′) ≥ sup
u∈F (x′)
w(u)
(2) ∀u ∈ R,w(u) ≥ r(u)}.
Moreover, the uniform value exists if F has convex values (or if one allows the player to play
a behavior strategy, i.e. to select randomly an element u in F (x) while at state x).
8In the second expression, Π(u, u′) denotes the set of probabilities on X×X with first marginal u and second
marginal u′.
9if d(x, x′) = 2 for all x, x′, then dK,R(z, z
′) = ‖z − z′‖1 for all z, z′ in ∆(X).
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The theorem also extend to general sequences of evaluations with vanishing total variation.
For partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) with finite set of states, ac-
tions and signals, the existence of the uniform value was first proved by Rosenberg, Solan and
Vieille (2002). The present theorem can not be applied as is in this case, because transitions are
not non expansive with respect to the KR-metric. However, an alternative metric introduced
in (Renault Venel 2017) can be used to apply the theorem to this class of games.
Recently, Venel and Ziliotto (2016) proved for these models the existence of the uniform
value in pure strategies, i.e. without the assumption that F has convex values.
2.2 A simple stochastic game with compact action sets and no limit
value
Let us consider stochastic games with finitely many states, compact actions sets and continuous
payoffs and transitions. Bolte, Gaubert and Vigeral (2015) proved the existence of the limit
value under some semi-algebraic (or more generally definability) conditions, and Vigeral (2013)
showed that the limit value may not exist without semi-algebraic conditions. The simple
example given here is a variant of an example from Ziliotto, 2016 (a variant is also mentioned in
Sorin Vigeral 2015). Contrary to Vigeral’s example, the transitions are very simple (polynomial)
but the action set of player 1 will be a countably infinite compact subset of the real line.
✧✦
★✥
✧✦
★✥
✧✦
★✥
✧✦
★✥
0∗ 1∗
0 1
P1 P2α
β
1− α− α2 1− β − β2
α2 β2
✲
✛
❄ ❄
❄ ❄
There are 4 states: K = {k0, k1, 0∗, 1∗}. States 0∗ and 1∗ are absorbing, and the payoff in
state k0, resp. k1, is 0, resp. 1. In state k0, Player 1 chooses α in some fixed set I ⊂ [0, 1/2],
and the next state is k1 with probability α, 0
∗ with probability α2 and k0 with the remaining
probability 1 − α− α2. Similarly, in state k1 player 2 chooses β in J , and the next state is k0
with probability β, 1∗ with probability β2 and k1 with the remaining probability. To obtain
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divergence of the values, we introduce a dissymmetry between players and assume that:
I = { 1
22n
, n ≥ 1}, and J = [0, 1/2].
Given a discount factor λ in (0, 1], we denote by xλ the value of the stochastic game with
discount λ and initial state k0, and by yλ the value of the stochastic game with discount λ and
initial state k1. The Shapley equations read:
xλ = max
α∈I
(1−λ)((1−α−α2)xλ+αyλ), and yλ = min
β∈J
(
λ+ (1− λ)((1− β − β2)yλ + βxλ + β2)
)
.
Substracting by xλ in the first equation and by yλ in the second equation we obtain:
λxλ = (1− λ)max
α∈I
(
α(yλ − xλ)− α2xλ
)
(6)
λyλ = λ+ (1− λ)min
β∈J
(β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1− yλ)) (7)
Since xλ > 0, eq. (6) gives that yλ > xλ.
Lemma 2.6. For λ ≤ 1/5,
4λ(1− yλ)2 = (1− λ)(yλ − xλ)2. (8)
Proof: Consider the convex minimization problem of player 2 given by (7). Either the minimum
is achieved for the interior point βλ :=
yλ−xλ
2(1−yλ) , and we get equation (8). Or in the case when
yλ−xλ > 1− yλ, it is achieved for β = 1/2 and we obtain (1− yλ)(1+ 3λ) = 2(1−λ)(yλ−xλ).
So in this case 1 + 3λ > 2(1− λ), which is not possible for λ ≤ 1/5.
Equation (8) will be our main tool. An immediate consequence is that yλ − xλ −→λ→0 0.
Look now at the concave maximization problem of player 1 given by (6), and denote by αλ > 0
the maximizer in I, we have:
λxλ = (1− λ)αλ(yλ − xλ)− (1− λ)α2λxλ.
The fact that I ⊂ J gives an advantage to player 2, which implies that no limit point of xλ
and yλ can be greater than 1/2:
Lemma 2.7. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors, such that yλn and xλn converge
to v in [0, 1]. Then v ≤ 1/2, yλn − xλn ∼ 2
√
λn(1− v) and βλn ∼
√
λn.
Proof: Using (8) and the definition of αλ, we get xλ(λ+α
2
λ) = λxλα
2
λ+2αλ
√
λ
√
1− λ(1−yλ).
Since λ + α2λ − 2αλ
√
λ ≥ 0, we obtain: λxλα2λ + 2αλ
√
λ
√
1− λ(1 − yλ) ≥ 2αλ
√
λxλ. Dividing
by αλ
√
λ and passing to the limit gives v ≤ 1/2. The asymptotics are given by (8) and the
definition of βλn .
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Lemma 2.8. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that
√
λn ∈ I for each n.
Then yλn and xλn converge to 1/2.
Proof: By considering a converging subsequence we can assume that yλn and xλn converge to
some v in [0, 1]. By the previous lemma, v ≤ 1/2, and we have to show that v ≥ 1/2. We have
for each λ in the subsequence, since player 1 can choose to play α =
√
λ:
λxλ ≥ (1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ)− (1− λ)λxλ.
Dividing by λ and passing to the limit, we obtain v ≥ 1/2.
Lemma 2.9. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that for each n, the open
interval (1
2
√
λn, 2
√
λn) does not intersect I. Then lim supn yλn ≤ 4/9.
Proof: Suppose that (up to a subsequence) xλn and yλn converges to some v ≥ 4/9. It is
enough to show that v = 4/9. We know that v ≤ 1/2 by lemma 2.7. Consider again the
maximization problem of player 1 given by (6), and denote by α∗(λ) = yλ−xλ
2(xλ−zλ) > 0 the argmax
of the unconstrained problem if player 1 could choose any α ≥ 0. Since α∗(λ) ∼ √λ1−v
v
we
have 1
2
√
λ ≤ α∗(λ) ≥ 2√λ for λ small in the sequence. By assumption (1
2
√
λ, 2
√
λ) contains no
point in I and the objective function of player 1 is increasing from 0 to α∗(λ) and decreasing
after α∗(λ). There are 2 possible cases:
If αλ ≤ 12
√
λ we have λxλ ≤ 12(1 − λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) − 14(1 − λ)λ − xλ. Dividing by λ and
passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 1− v − 1
4
v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Otherwise, αλ > 2
√
λ and we have λxλ ≤ 2(1−λ)
√
λ(yλ−xλ)−4(1−λ)λxλ. Again, dividing
by λ and passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 4(1− v)− 4v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Finally, the sequence λn =
1
22n
satisfies the assumption of lemma 2.8, and the sequence
λn =
1
22n+1
satisfies those of lemma 2.9. This is enough to conclude that vλ(k0) and vλ(k1) have
no limit when λ goes to 0.
2.3 The CV of (vn)n and (vλ)λ are equivalent.
The equivalence between the uniform convergence of (vn)n and (vλ)λ, which holds in general in
1-player games, has been recently proved (Ziliotto 2015) to extend to a large class of stochastic
games.
It applies in particular to the following setup. Assume the set of states K and the set of
actions I and J are compact metric spaces, that the transition q : K×I×J −→ ∆(K) and the
payoff g : K×I×J −→ IR are jointly continuous. Together with an initial state k , (K, I, J, q, g)
define a stochastic game. Then one can show that for each n and each λ the value of the n-stage
game vn(k) and vλ(k) exist and satisfy the Shapley equations: ∀n ≥ 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1], ∀k ∈ K,
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(n + 1) vn+1(k) = sup
x∈∆(I)
inf
y∈∆(J)
(
g(k, x, y)) + n IEq(k,x,y)(vn)
)
,
= inf
y∈∆(J)
sup
x∈∆(I)
(
g(k, x, y)) + n IEq(k,x,y)(vn)
)
.
vλ(k) = sup
x∈∆(I)
inf
y∈∆(J)
(
λ g(k, x, y) + (1− λ) IEq(k,x,y)(vλ)
)
,
= inf
y∈∆(J)
sup
x∈∆(I)
(
λ g(k, x, y) + (1− λ) IEq(k,x,y)(vλ)
)
,
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